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Abstract 
 
There has been increasing discussion in the economic literature, about the 
appropriateness of using general population values within technology appraisal.  
This paper proposes an alternative approach to incorporating patient values into 
the cost-effectiveness decision rule that lies at the heart of funding decisions.  
Whilst the current decision rule is constructed around a technical question, 
namely, ‘which treatment is the most cost-effective?’, the key policy question is 
‘which treatments should be offered to the patient?’.  A two-part decision rule is 
explored which gives the patient the choice of the most cost-effective treatment 
plus all cheaper options.  Whilst the adoption of this patient-based cost-
effectiveness rule may not alter many decisions compared to the current 
approach, it would represent a profound shift in the way that patient values and 
patient choice are incorporated into economic evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Purchasers of health care across the world increasingly make decisions about 
which treatments can be used by patients using cost-effectiveness considerations.  
Within this framework, effectiveness is most frequently measured using quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs).  QALYs are calculated by summing morbidity 
weighted life-expectancy, with the weights typically based around mean values 
generated from a sample of the general population.  The weights represent 
valuations of health-related well-being (or utility), and are anchored on 1 
(representing full-health) and 0 (representing death or health states considered 
to be equivalent to death). 
 
There has been increasing discussion in the economic literature, about the 
appropriateness of using these general population values within technology 
appraisal (Brazier et al.,  2005).  It is argued, by some, that patient values are 
better estimates of health-related well-being as patients have first hand 
experience of the health state.  Describing a particular health state, then asking a 
member of the general public to place a value on it, is potentially flawed by the 
limitations of the descriptive system used to describe the health state and the 
ability of a member of public to imagine what it is like to be in that health state.  
Given these problems, it is little wonder that large differences between patient 
and public values are observed. 
 
Despite these problems, the use of general population values continue to 
dominate technology appraisals, although the reasons for this tend to focus on 
the potential disadvantages of using patient values.  One group of influential 
economists argued that society should adopt a ‘veil of ignorance’ when choosing 
health state values to purposely avoid the influence of self interest (Gold et al., 
1996).  Such self interest, it has been argued, can lead to strategic behaviour 
when collecting health values.  Another problem avoided by the use of population 
values is that some aspects of patient values may want to be excluded from our 
valuation of health outcomes.  Adaptation, it is argued can lead to patients being 
satisfied with their diminished functioning, thus leading to higher than expected 
values, and conversely, lower than expected gains from treatment. 
 
The disquiet around the problems with general population values has led to calls 
for using better informed general population values.  Such values are seen as 
having the benefits of maintaining a social perspective, with fewer of the 
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problems associated with their lack of experiential knowledge.  Whilst there is an 
increasing amount of work around patient values, and their role within technology 
appraisal, the cost-effectiveness decision rule that lies at the heart of funding 
decisions has remained unquestioned. 
 
 
The current cost-effectiveness rule 
 
The cost-effectiveness rule used routinely in technology appraisal is that for any 
given monetary value placed on health (or a QALY), the recommended treatment 
for funding is identified as that with the highest incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio (ICER) that falls beneath this threshold value1. 
 
This cost-effectiveness rule can be illustrated using Table 1.  ‘Do nothing’ 
represents a situation where no active therapy is given to the patient, treatments 
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ are new, more expensive therapies.  Using the current decision 
rule, and a threshold value of £30 000 per QALY, we see that treatment A is 
deemed the most cost-effective, and is therefore recommended for patients with 
the condition. 
 
 
Table 1:  Cost-effectiveness of four hypothetical treatment choices 
 
Treatment Cost QALYs Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio 
relative to DN 
Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio 
relative to next 
best option 
C 100 000 5.5 39 600 100 000 
A 50 000 5.0 24 500 20 000 
B 20 000 3.5 38 000 38 000 
Do nothing (DN) 1 000 3.0   
 
 
 
However, the current decision rule is constructed around a technical question, 
namely, ‘which is the most cost-effective treatment?’, when the question that 
should be asked is ‘which treatments should be offered to the patient?’.  Under 
the current rule, some patient choice remains as a patient can not be forced to 
accept the therapy deemed most-cost-effective; they actually have the choice of 
‘Do nothing’ and ‘A’.  However, some patients may prefer treatment ‘B’ over 
treatment ‘A’, but are not allowed this under the decision rule, even though it is 
expected to cost less than A.2 
 
This situation is produced because mean ex post general population values and 
ex ante individual patient values rank the treatments differently; population 
values suggest that treatment ‘A’ is preferred, whilst patient values suggest that 
treatment ‘B’ is preferred.  It also produces an inconsistency with respect to the 
implied patient choice within the current decision rule; patients are able to choose 
one treatment which costs less but is deemed less effective based on mean 
general population values (i.e. ‘Do nothing’), but not another (i.e. ‘B’). 
 
                                               
1 Although the decision rule should relate to the increment relative to the next best option, the rule is 
frequently operationalised with the increment relating to ‘do nothing’ or ‘current treatment’. 
2 The position of treatment A is recognised by economists in terms of ‘extended dominance’ 
(Weinstein 1990), a concept that is used to rule out the treatment from further consideration as a 
potentially cost-effective treatment. 
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Whilst this is an interesting hypothetical example, is it likely to happen in the real 
world? 
 
 
The case of osteoporosis 
 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) Technology Appraisal 87 (NICE 
2005) sets out recommendations for the use of bisphosphonates, selective 
oestrogen receptor modulators and parathyroid hormone for the secondary 
prevention of osteoporotic fragility in postmenopausal women.  The cost-
effectiveness analysis for this appraisal is complex with alternative figures 
produced for alternative evidence bases, and patient populations described in 
terms of age and bone mineral density.  A summary of the results are given in 
Table 2, which includes a single bisphosphonate (as opposed to the three which 
were assessed), raloxifene, oestrogen, and teriparatide. 
 
In summary, the guidance recommended bisphosphonates as the preferred 
treatment, with the option for using raloxifene if bisphosphonates were 
contraindicated, produced an unsatisfactory response or if patients were 
physically unable to comply with the strict directions for taking bisphosphonate 
medications (NICE 2005).  The use of bisphosphonates entails fasting and 
ingestion of medication at least 30 minutes before breakfast and remain standing 
for 30 minutes after taking the tablet. 
 
 
Table 2:  Cost-effectiveness of treatments for the secondary prevention 
of osteoporotic fragility in postmenopausal women at 70 years of age* 
 
Treatment Cost QALYs Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio 
relative to DN** 
Incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio 
relative to next best 
option*** 
Teriparatide 7 172 5.54 134 728 -1 257 781 
Raloxifene 3 147 5.55 29 993 -24 371 
Alendronate 2 818 5.56 16 934 8 934 
Oestrogen 2 383 5.51 69 585 69 585 
Do nothing 1 868 5.50   
 
* Some treatments and analytic scenarios have been excluded from the full table 
presented by Stevenson and colleagues (2005) for simplicity. 
** Figures taken from report.  ICERs based on model estimates, whilst costs and 
QALYs are rounded. 
*** Figures calculated from table, as they are not available from the report.  ICER for 
Oestrogen kept the same as in previous column for consistency. 
 
 
The NICE guidance did not allow patients the choice of taking oestrogen, even 
though it is possible that they would consider the lifestyle restrictions associated 
with alendronate as being disruptive to the extent that oestrogen was considered 
preferable.  In such a situation, the patient would be offered a treatment that 
they considered to be worse and more expensive (alendronate).  Only if they 
were “physically unable” to follow the treatment directions would they be allowed 
to even consider another treatment choice (raloxifene), and then not oestrogen. 
 
Whilst there are some added complexities with this technology appraisal, due to 
other uncertainties relating to oestrogen and raloxifene, the example serves to 
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highlight the potential for cheaper, patient-preferred treatment options to exist in 
real life and to be omitted from treatment options by reimbursement authorities. 
 
 
A patient-based cost-effectiveness rule 
 
Clearly, the current decision rule is capable of producing uncomfortable scenarios 
that are generated by differences between mean general population values and 
individual patient values.  Some work has been undertaken to assess the 
feasibility of calculating patient specific ICERs (Sculpher 1998).  However, this 
approach requires the elicitation of ex ante health states from all patients 
requiring treatment so as to calculate individual expected QALYs, which is a 
daunting prospect. 
 
A partial resolution of the problem is to reformulate the current decision rule so 
that it better reflects the key question of ‘which treatments should be offered to 
the patient?’.  The proposal raised here, is to allow patients to have a choice over 
the most cost-effective therapy (as adjudged by mean general population 
values), those treatments that are less costly than the cost-effective therapy, and 
‘do nothing’.  Patients would not be given the choice of therapies that are more 
expensive and more costly than the most cost-effective therapy (for example, ‘C’ 
in Table 1). 
 
This reflects a two-part decision process; the identification of the most cost-
effective therapy using mean general population values (i.e. the current rule), 
then relative to that, the identification of those treatments that are cheaper than 
the most cost-effective therapy. 
 
Under this patient-based cost-effectiveness rule, if a patient prefers a treatment 
such as ‘B’ in Table 1 (or oestrogen in Table 2), they should be able to choose it.  
In effect they have adjudged that their well-being will be greater under ‘B’ than 
for ‘A’ and the mean costs are lower.  In other words, when assessing the 
patient-preference ICER, ‘B’ dominates.  Treatment ‘C’ would not be offered even 
if the patient chose it, as the increased well-being needs to be traded-off with 
increased costs. 
 
One further issue is worth consideration.  It is possible that a form of adverse 
selection could exist, whereby those who choose B are expected to have costs 
much greater than the mean population values (i.e. £20 000).  This would result 
in higher patient well being but potentially very high costs.  This can be guarded 
against by using sub-group analyses to see if they belong to a patient group who 
are expected to have higher costs that A. 
 
The patient based cost-effectiveness rule then becomes: you offer the patient the 
choice of the treatment that has the highest ICER under the threshold, or a lower 
cost treatment if and only if they belong to a patient sub-group that has lower 
expected costs than the most cost-effective option. 
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Potential problems 
 
Two issues are worth further consideration.  Firstly, the nature of the cost savings 
produced by the proposed rule, as these are not certain.  Secondly, the ‘validity’ 
of a rule which offers a pragmatic solution with no theoretical base. 
 
Nature of the cost savings 
 
The patient-based cost-effectiveness rule offers the possibility of patients 
choosing a cheaper treatment (‘B’) than that recommended using the current 
approach (‘A’).  However, it is possible that without this choice, some patients 
would have chosen ‘do nothing’.  In such circumstances, the offer of an 
alternative treatment (‘B’) raises the possibility of increased costs.  Consequently, 
whether the proposed rule is cost-saving or cost-increasing at the population 
level, is an empirical question. 
 
Theoretical validity of the rule 
 
Whilst the proposed rule has been described in the context of cost-effectiveness 
decisions, and taps into notions of a patient-preference ICER, it does not have the 
theoretical base of cost-effectiveness analysis.  It is a pragmatic solution, that 
mixes together societal and patient perspectives.  It could also be argued that the 
wider choice it provides moves away from the notion of the public provision of 
health care, to a social insurance model where patients have a right to choose 
from a menu of approved treatments. 
 
So, does the lack of a theoretical foundation and the mixing up different 
perspectives within a decision rule invalidate the rule?  It is clear that the NHS 
does not operate a single all-encompassing evaluative framework.  Whilst extra-
welfarism is used by many health economists to justify the predominant 
evaluative framework used by themselves, the NHS uses a range of decision 
making criteria from a mixture of sources; theoretical, pragmatic and political. 
 
These different views are recognised by Drummond and colleagues (Drummond 
et al, 2005) who contrast the pragmatic ‘decision-making approach’ with the 
theoretical approaches of welfarism and extra-welfarism.  The rule forwarded in 
this paper is clearly pragmatic, and from a decision-making perspective, I would 
argue that its desirability can be evaluated.  The decision maker needs to 
evaluate whether the benefits the rule confers in terms of greater choice and 
greater health benefits as evaluated by the patient, are worth the potential extra 
cost and reduced health benefits as evaluated by a population tariff. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Cost-effectiveness rules have developed to answer a technical question, without 
due regard for patient choice.  Amending this rule allows greater choice for the 
patient without necessarily increasing the programme cost.  However, using the 
metric of general population values this alternative decision rule reduces health 
gains.  This loss of ex post society-valued health gain must be balanced against 
the increase in patient choice and ex ante patient-valued health gain.  Whether 
society is willing to bear the potential extra cost for these gains becomes the 
central question. 
 
It should be noted that when funding decisions are operationalised, health care 
professionals reinterpret them to allow patient choices of this nature.  It is also 
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possible that such circumstances are rare, and made rarer still by the use of non-
cost effectiveness information in the decision process to account for patient 
concerns. Consequently, the adoption of this patient-based cost-effectiveness rule 
may not alter many decisions compared to the current approach. Even if this 
were the case, it would represent a small but profound shift in the way in which 
evaluations are conceptualised, by recognising the central importance of patient 
values and patient choice. 
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